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Sticky assessments – the impact of teachers’ grading 
standard on pupils’ school performance 
 
Tamás Keller 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper argues that school grades cannot be interpreted solely as a reward for a given 
school performance, since they also reflect teachers’ ratings of pupils. Grades therefore 
contain valuable information about pupils’ own – usually unknown – ability.  
The incorporated assessment in grade might be translated into self-assessment, which could 
influence the effort that pupils invest in education. Getting discounted grades in year 6 for a 
given level of math performance assessed using a PISA-like test has a positive effect on math 
test scores in year 8 of elementary education and also influences later outcomes in secondary 
education. The empirical analysis tries to minimize the possible bias caused by the 
measurement error in year 6 test scores (unmeasured ability) and employs classroom fixed-
effect instrumental variable (IV) regression and difference-in-difference models. The main 
analysis is based on a unique Hungarian individual-level panel dataset with two observations 
about the same individual – one in year 6 (12/13 years old) and again two years later, in year 
8 (14/15 years old) of elementary education. The data for three entire school cohorts is 
analyzed – approximately 140,000 individuals.  
 
Highlights 
 
 Examines the impact of teachers’ grading standards on pupils’ school performance 
 Takes advantage of having two different measures of pupils’ math knowledge: teacher-
given grades and centralized test scores  
 Assumes that grades are more than test scores, since they incorporate teachers’ ratings 
 Tries to estimate teachers’ grading standards and minimizes unmeasured ability bias by 
employing IV regression and diff-in-diff approaches 
 Finds that year 6 grades positively influence year 8 test scores and year 10 outcomes 
 Argues that teachers’ assessments translate to self-assessment, which influences pupils’ 
effort 
 Concludes that grading standards in elementary school accompany pupils to secondary 
school 
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A diákokhoz nőtt osztályzatok – a tanári osztályzás 
hatása a diákok iskolai teljesítményére 
 
Keller Tamás 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A tanulmány érvelése szerint az iskolai osztályzatok nem kizárólag egy adott iskolai 
teljesítmény objektív mérései, hanem egyúttal szubjektív tanári visszajelzések is. Az iskolai 
jegyekben visszatükröződő tanári értékelés kifejezetten fontos információt adhat a diákoknak 
saját – sokszor nem pontosan ismert – képességükről. A tanári értékelések ugyanakkor 
könnyen befolyásolhatják a diákok önértékelését is, amely meghatározza, hogy a diákok 
mennyit fektetnek a tanulásba. Eredményeink szerint, ha valaki hatodik osztályban az 
Országos Kompetencia teszten elért matematika teljesítményéhez képest diszkontált 
matematika jegyet kap, ez pozitívan befolyásolja nyolcadik osztályos teszt-eredményét, sőt 
középiskolai mutatót is. Empirikus elemzésünkben igyekszünk minimalizálni az abból fakadó 
torzítást, hogy a hatodik osztályos teszteredmények jelentős mérési hibával mérik a diákok 
tényleges képességeit, ez pedig torzíthatja az iskolai osztályzatokban vélt tanári értékelés 
hatását. Ezt a problémát kezelendő, osztály fix hatásokat tartalmazó instrumentális becslések, 
illetve difference-in-difference modellek eredményeit vizsgáljuk. A tanulmány fő elemzésében 
az Országos Kompetencia Mérésből azokkal az általános iskolás diákokkal foglalkozunk, akik 
hatodik és nyolcadik között nem váltottak osztályt. Három teljes iskolai kohorszot vizsgálunk, 
ami nagyjából 140 ezer megfigyelést jelent. 
 
Tárgyszavak: Iskolai teljesítmény; Diszkontált/inflált osztályzatok; Tanári visszajelzés,  
A jó tanár; Iskolai panel vizsgálatok; Országos Kompetencia Mérés 
 
JEL kódok: I20, I21, J24 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Grading pupils’ performance in school is a well-known practice among teachers. It is 
established that grades reflect pupils’ achievement; however since the variation within 
teachers’ grading practices is large, there is a considerable heterogeneity in how teachers 
weight the importance of different grading principles (McMillan et al. 2002). On the other 
hand, little is known about the impact of teachers’ grading style on pupils’ later school 
performance. Particularly little research has investigated the consequences of getting inflated 
grades for a given level of performance. Recently Terrier (2014) analyzed a similar question 
at classroom level, and found that those classrooms where teachers rewarded girls with better 
grades than boys for a given academic achievement are also classrooms where girls 
progressed more.  
The main analysis uses individual panel data for three entire school cohorts in Hungary, 
and analyzes the change in individual math test scores for more than 140,000 pupils between 
year 6 and year 8 of elementary school. It takes advantage of having two measures from the 
same time about pupils’ math knowledge: the one is teacher given and the other is assessed 
by a centralized PISA-like test, developed and conducted by the Hungarian Educational 
Authority. It is assumed that since both measures reflect pupils’ math knowledge, in a 
regression equation where later math knowledge is regressed on lagged math knowledge and 
lagged grades, the impact of grades captures the effect of a teacher’s rating. The paper will 
also go beyond this assumption and will try to minimize the bias arising from the fact that 
lagged test scores are only an imperfect measure of pupils’ math knowledge, and therefore 
unmeasured ability might bias the estimated parameter for grades. To deal with this issue, 
instrumental variable and difference-in-difference (hereafter diff-in-diff) methods will be 
employed. 
It is argued that the teachers’ assessments contained in the grades could be transformed 
into self-assessment. Since pupils usually do not know their true level of ability, feedback 
about their performance – contained in grades – could be an important source of knowledge 
about their own skills. If this feedback is positive – e.g. pupils receive better grades for a 
given level of school performance – it will boost their self-assessment. Higher perception of 
own ability might contribute to the choice of the optimal level of effort, which might influence 
later school performance. Since school performance is assumed to be a combination of ability 
and effort, and effort is costly, if pupils are assured that the effort will be worthwhile (because 
they are more able than their peers), they will likely invest more effort in education, which 
could increase their later school achievement (Azmat and Iriberri 2010).  
7 
 
Answering this question about the possible outcomes of grades might be important, since 
there is considerable literature (Rockoff 2004; Wright, Horn, and Sanders 1997) showing 
that teachers do influence pupils’ academic achievement. Much less attention has been 
devoted to the specific teacher characteristics that could increase pupils’ achievement. 
Previous research on this topic has shown that the predictive power of teachers’ observable 
characteristics – like age or type of degree – have little or no power to explain pupils’ 
academic achievement (Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005). Teachers’ grading style, however, 
could be an important characteristic, especially if it influences pupils’ school performance.  
1.1. SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECIES AND RELATIVE PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK 
 
Prior research about grading standard (Betts and Grogger 2003; Terrier 2014) analyzed the 
impact of grades on subsequent achievement as a classroom-level characteristic and not as an 
individual-level characteristic, such as how being over- or under-rated could influence later 
school performance. If teachers’ biased grading standards influence pupils achievement, this 
could act as a self-fulfilling prophecy (e.g. those who are over-rated will perform better). 
There is an extended literature on how self-fulfilling prophecies induce students’ later 
achievement. Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) conducted an experiment in which they told 
elementary school teachers that some pupils in the class would soon demonstrate a large gain 
in school achievement. Although they told the teachers that this information about their 
pupils came from the results of a test they had run on the children, in fact the test was non-
existent and the researcher had randomly assigned pupils to the treated and the control 
groups. One year later, pupils predicted to be ‘bloomers’ showed larger progress in IQ than 
the control group.  
However the findings of Rosenthal and Jacobson’s research were not universally 
acclaimed (Snow 1969). They provoked scientific debate, which was reviewed by Jussim and 
Harber (2005). The criticism mainly concerns the fact that after the first year not only the 
experimental group, but also the control group, experienced considerable progress in IQ, and 
in later years the difference between the two groups averaged out. Research on the impact of 
self-fulfilling prophecies showed that they have a weak positive impact on later school 
achievement (Jussim and Eccles 1992), which varies according to social status and ethnicity 
(Jussim, Eccles, and Madon 1996). It has also been shown that positive prophecies were 
more powerful than negative ones (Madon, Jussim, and Eccles 1997). 
On the other hand, feedback could be received not only in the form of grades or in how 
teachers treat pupils, but also more indirectly, with information gleaned by pupils about their 
own relative performance. Taking advantage of natural experiments, it has been shown that if 
pupils are informed of the average grade point in their classroom (Azmat and Iriberri 2010), 
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or if they know their own relative position on a nationwide test (Goulas and Megalokonomou 
2015) the information provided positively affects their later school achievement. Since later 
performance is a combination of ability and effort, and since individual effort is costly, if 
pupils realize that it is worth their while (because they are good relative to others), they might 
invest more effort in studying hard, which could be translated later into better school 
performance.  
However, self-fulfilling prophecies and relative performance feedback have different 
implications about the role of teachers. Both mechanisms help pupils to decide on the 
optimal level of effort. But in self-fulfilling prophecies teachers play an active role, giving 
signals to pupils; whereas if pupils receive relative performance feedback, then the teachers 
are passive actors, and pupils are basically inspired by possessing new background 
information about the relative position of their knowledge. Therefore there is a need to have a 
closer look at why grades could influence later achievement.  
1.2. POSSIBLE MECHANISMS FOR WHY GRADES MIGHT INFLUENCE SCHOOL 
PERFORMANCE 
 
Previous research (Betts and Grogger 2003) has argued that the higher grading standards of 
schools increase the achievement of pupils with the best performance. Weaker-performing 
students, on the other hand, may perceive themselves to be falling behind on a relative basis, 
even if their performance increases over time. Since pupils tend to perceive their 
performance in relative (rather than absolute) terms, higher grading standards could 
decrease the perceived probability of future educational success among those who have good 
performance in absolute terms, but only average performance in relative terms. 
Research into self-concept also demonstrates that the achievement of peers could 
negatively influence the way in which pupils evaluate themselves. The big-fish–little-pond 
effect (Marsh and Hau 2003) suggests that, in terms of self-concept, a talented pupil will gain 
more if he is in a less-competitive classroom (little pond) than if he is put into a more 
competitive environment, with only big (or bigger) ‘fishes’. In other words, while self-concept 
is influenced negatively by class average performance, a pupil’s own performance maintains a 
positive effect (Marsh and Parker 1984; Marsh and Hau 2003; Marsh et al. 2008).  
That said, it is plausible to assume that relative within-classroom differences in grades – 
or, put differently, in teachers’ assessments – could influence subsequent performance by 
boosting self-assessment. If someone assesses his own knowledge positively, he might think 
it worthwhile to invest effort, since the probability of failure will be small. The self-worth 
theory (Covington 1984) suggests that the positive perception of ability activates school 
achievement. Self-efficacy is known to be influenced by positive feedback about performance 
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(Schunk 1985). Furthermore children’s belief in their own ability and their expectation of 
success strongly influence their educational outcomes (Wigfield and Eccles 2000).  
The economic literature also establishes the positive impact of self-confidence on 
achievement. Filippin and Paccagnella (2011) showed in their model that those who initially 
overestimate their abilities (a sign of self-confidence) will follow more ambitious educational 
paths and can accumulate more knowledge than those with low self-confidence, who 
underestimate their ability. Positive self-assessment (knowledge about own ability) translates 
into the choice of demanding education at the secondary level (Keller 2014), and perceived 
probability of success increases the decision to choose to go on to tertiary education (Keller 
and Neidhöfer 2014; Tolsma, Need, and de Jong 2010). 
Self-assessment is clearly not the only way in which better grades could increase later 
achievement. It is argued, however, that other channels – such as a pupil’s acceptance by 
peers (Wentzel and Caldwell 1997) or interest in the subject (Trautwein et al. 2006) – 
basically also have the side effect of increasing self-assessment. Therefore throughout the 
analysis this causal mechanism will be assumed to lie behind the impact of teachers’ ratings. 
An opposite interpretation would, however, be to assume that better grades do not 
motivate pupils to invest more effort, but rather having achieved a good grade they reduce 
their efforts, which could translate into negative subsequent school performance. Some kind 
of efficiency optimization is already established in the literature, but not in a classroom 
environment. It is known, for example, that researchers’ scientific achievement declines once 
they achieve academic tenure; this is interpreted as indicating that if external sanctions are 
removed, and if people already have some kind of work security, their motivation to increase 
their performance is less pronounced (Holley 1977; Park and Gordon 1996). Other analyses 
show that employees who spend longer in a given job report boredom more frequently, which 
could hinder performance of the job (Ng and Feldman 2013) and could be explained by the 
loss in motivation and stimulation in a given work activity. 
Deciding whether inflated grades have a positive or a negative effect on subsequent 
school performance is partly an empirical question. Therefore there is a need to undertake a 
more profound analysis and to investigate this question at the individual level (unlike in prior 
analysis). This is what will be done in this analysis.  
1.3. THE PURPOSE OF THE ANALYSIS 
 
Given the gap in prior research into the impact of grades on subsequent school achievement, 
this paper gives insight into whether grades do induce later progress in school performance. 
It will be argued that teachers’ biased assessments translate into self-assessment, and 
positive knowledge of their own abilities increases the likelihood of pupils investing in the 
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effort of learning. Since effort is costly, pupils who have more positive knowledge of their own 
ability are assumed to be more likely to make this investment, simply because they are 
assured – in the form of their positive self-assessment – that the investment will not be in 
vain.  
During the empirical analysis special attention will be devoted to dealing with the 
measurement error of test scores. This is necessary, since in a regression setting, where test 
scores are explained by prior test scores and grades, grades will show teachers’ ratings only if 
a pupil’s latent ability is controlled for entirely in prior test scores. Since test scores measure 
pupils’ knowledge with noise, the impact of grades could be biased. This bias will be dealt 
with by choosing an instrumental variable approach, where grades are instrumented with 
school behavior, and by utilizing the diff-in-diff approach, which eliminates time-invariant 
ability from the estimation. 
2. METHOD 
2.1. DATA 
 
Data are derived from the National Assessment of Basic Competencies (NABC), which is a 
Hungarian micro-level educational panel dataset that targets the full cohort of year 6, 8 and 
10 students and measures their mathematical skills and reading literacy, using a PISA-like 
test. Pupils take a math and a reading comprehension test on the same day. The test takes 
four sessions of 45 minutes, and pupils have a 10 minute break after each session. The aim of 
the test is to assess how pupils are able to use the knowledge learnt at school in new 
situations, which have a practical focus. The test itself is written in the usual classroom and 
pupils are instructed by their teachers. However, the test questions are developed by the 
Hungarian Educational Authority, and the correction of the test is also organized by that 
authority.  
The main analysis focuses on the change between year 6 and year 8, by three different 
cohorts of NABC. Cohort 2008 completed year 6 in 2008 and year 8 in 2010; cohort 2009 
completed year 6 in 2009 and year 8 in 2011, while in the case of cohort 2010 there are 
observations for 2010 and 2012.  
2.2. SAMPLE 
 
The sample in the analysis is restricted to those who changed neither school nor class within 
a school (referred as ‘classrooms’) between year 6 and year 8. If those who changed class 
were also included, it would not be possible to determine if the change in test scores was a by-
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product of the change of class. Only classrooms with more than five persons are considered, 
in order to have a meaning behind the use of classroom fixed effects.  
This restriction implies that the sample in the main analysis contains only pupils in 
elementary education.* In Hungary, pupils can move up to secondary school after the year 4, 
6 or 8 of primary education. However, most pupils choose a secondary school after year 8, 
when elementary education ends and everybody who has not already done so must change 
school. Since early transition to secondary school correlates positively with social status and 
pupil ability (Horn 2013), restricting the sample to those who have remained in the same 
classroom environment means that pupils in the sample have a somewhat lower level of 
ability than the cohort as a whole.  
On the other hand, the restriction also means limiting the sample to those who managed 
the two-year progression within two academic years. Pupils who dropped out, moved abroad 
or are simply missing from the year 8 data (c. 6.6% of all year 6 pupils) are not included in 
the sample. Since dropping out is the most likely explanation for why somebody is missing 
from the data in year 8, pupils in the sample have a higher school performance than the 
whole year 6 cohort.  
As matters stand, even though in NABC there is no information on the teacher, it could be 
assumed that in the majority of cases it was the same person in years 6 and 8, since ability 
grouping within the same classroom is more likely in secondary schools (from year 9). 
Furthermore, schools usually employ different teachers in the first four years of elementary 
education, whereas in the majority of schools the same teacher teaches a subject throughout 
the second four years (unless the teacher retires or goes on parental leave). 
During the empirical analysis many different approaches will be used to eliminate 
unmeasured ability. One of these approaches is the diff-in-diff method (to be discussed later), 
which leads to loss of the time sequence in the data, since it utilizes the differences between 
year 6 and year 8. Therefore, if the data allow, the year 10 outcomes are also analyzed. 
Analyzing year 10 outcomes is only possible for two cohorts (Cohort 2008 and Cohort 2009), 
since year 10 data were not available for Cohort 2010 at the time of our analysis.  
2.3. MEASURES 
2.3.1. Test scores 
 
Pupils’ math knowledge is partly measured by the NABC test. The test is written towards the 
end of the academic year, usually in May. Although test scores in reading comprehension are 
                                                 
* Everybody who chose the early secondary track is excluded, even those who did so after year 4 of 
elementary school.  
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also available, they are not used in this analysis, since the NABC test in reading 
comprehension requires skills and knowledge that differ from those taught in school in the 
Hungarian literature and grammar lessons (and for which pupils receive grades). For 
example, oral presentation is also part of the grade in Hungarian (learning a poem by heart), 
but the NABC contains only written tests. There is a greater similarity between the NABC 
math test and the tests conducted in school, simply because they are similar exercises, 
requiring a similar way of thinking. Even then, though, it could be that a particular pupil is 
good at algebra, but the NABC test contained mainly exercises in calculus, which this 
(hypothetical) pupil is not very good at. This scenario is thought, however, to be not very 
likely, since NABC basically measures applied knowledge and does not test knowledge in a 
particular domain of math. The test score in math is standardized with 0 mean and 1 unit 
standard deviation. Test scores are interpreted as a kind of blind measure about pupils’ 
knowledge, since the person who corrects the tests does not know the pupils personally. 
2.3.2. School grades 
 
Pupils’ math knowledge is also measured by grades awarded by the teacher – as a kind of 
non-blind measure, since teachers do know the pupils personally. Grades reported in pupils’ 
mid-term report cards are used; these are basically the average of the grades received by 
pupils for tests set by the math teacher between September and January. The mid-term 
report card is issued in January, a few months before the test scores are measured.  
In Hungary, school grades range from 1 to 5, where 1 is the worst and 5 is the best. If a 
pupil receives a grade of 1 at the end of the semester for three or more different subjects, he 
or she must repeat the whole year. If someone receives a grade of 1 in one or two subjects, he 
can take extra examinations to determine whether the year must be repeated. While a grade 
of 1 has more serious consequences at the end of the academic year, it is also a cause for 
concern if it appears on the earlier report card, since that could indicate the future outcome. 
Because being awarded the worst grade could contribute to a pupil dropping out, teachers 
sometimes avoid giving a grade 1 (simply avoiding the psychological consequences and the 
extra hassle). 
2.3.3. School behavior 
 
Pupils’ school behavior is also reported in their mid-term report card. This is basically a 
grade ranging from 1 to 5, as with other subjects. The school behavior is evaluated by the 
form teacher, who is not necessarily the same as the math teacher. These grades are not part 
of pupils’ grade-point average. They basically serve to provide information about school 
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behavior, but do not directly influence pupils’ later educational career, or their evaluation in 
other subjects.  
2.3.4. Other controls 
 
There is no need to use many individual controls, since lagged math test scores capture 
individual factors that are stable over time and that influence pupils’ performance. However, 
since test scores (and especially grades) might be connected to gender differences (Terrier 
2014), a dummy variable showing whether the respondent is female will be included in every 
model.  
2.3.5. Year 10 outcomes 
 
There are three different types of outcomes in year 10. There are two measures of the 
educational tracks followed by someone in year 10. There is a binary variable, coded 1 if 
someone goes to a secondary school (from where there is direct access to tertiary education) 
and coded 0 if that person follows the vocational track (from where there is no direct entry to 
tertiary education). This is a kind of horizontal difference between the secondary tracks. 
Another dummy variable distinguishes between the two secondary tracks: it is coded 1 if a 
pupil follows the secondary general track (the academic track), and 0 if someone has been 
admitted to the secondary vocational track, which is basically a mixed version of the 
secondary and the vocational track, but offers a high-school final exam, which is necessary to 
enter tertiary education. 
The math test score in year 10 also appears as a potential outcome (with 0 mean and 1 
unit standard deviation). However, between year 8 and year 10 every pupil in the sample 
changes classroom, and even school – since they move from elementary education to 
secondary education – and so year 10 outcomes might also be influenced by the chosen 
secondary track (Hermann 2013). This should be considered and will be controlled for. 
Lastly, the highest educational level that someone aspires to in year 10 is also analyzed. 
This question is used as a dummy variable, which is 1 if someone plans to go on to tertiary 
education and 0 otherwise. 
2.3.6. Fixed effects 
 
Classroom fixed effects are employed in every model. This basically defines the school class of 
year 6, but because the sample is restricted to those who did not change classroom between 
year 6 and year 8, it is the same as the year 8 classroom. Because every classroom has a 
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different ID, there is no need to control for cohort additionally. Analyzing year 10 outcomes, 
the combination of the year 6 classroom and the year 10 school will appear as fixed effects.  
2.4. Identification 
 
The aim of the analysis is to estimate the following equation (Eq. 1), where the math test 
score for the ith individual in the jth classroom in time t is explained with the same test score 
for the same individual in the same classroom in time t-1, controlling for the math grade that 
pupil received in time t-1. Using the lagged test score variable in the equation, every 
individual-level characteristic is controlled for which influenced pupils’ prior math 
knowledge and which is assumed to be stable over time – such as ability, motivation, parental 
background, popularity with peers, or gender. Applying classroom-level fixed effects (π) is a 
parsimonious way of controlling for every factor that is shared by classmates and that has a 
clear effect on educational achievement – such as teachers, textbooks, class size, peer quality, 
etc.  
 
 (Eq. 1) 
 
However, dynamic panel models (like Eq. 1) are known to underestimate the parameters, 
as was shown by Halaby (2004), since the unobservable time-invariant component of errors 
might also be correlated to the dependent variable and its lagged variant on the right-hand 
side. This feature of the model is accepted in the analysis and not treated further. 
Eq. 1 takes advantage of having two different measures about pupils’ knowledge in math: 
one is given by teachers (grade) and the second (score) is assessed by a standardized and 
centralized test (NABC), organized and developed by the Hungarian Educational Authority. 
Both measures could be regarded as a proxy for pupils’ math knowledge, which is assumed 
not to be observable directly. Since score is measured by an independent institution, it is 
assumed not to be shaped by teachers’ ratings, but these ratings are considered to be 
captured in grades, since they are assigned by teachers. Therefore grade contains pupils’ 
math knowledge (Ωg) and teachers’ rating (Φ) as well. Hence it is assumed that:  
 
        (Eq. 2) 
 
The focus of the analysis is on estimating teachers’ rating (Φ) on the progress in 
individual test scores. Having another measure about pupils’ knowledge (score) β2 in Eq. 1 is 
thought to show the impact of the teacher’s rating. This premise is realistic, since grades are 
given by teachers who know pupils personally; however, the NABC test is corrected by 
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independent scholars, who do not know whose test they are correcting, and hence score does 
not contain Φ.  
However, the assumption that grade shows the teacher’s rating holds only if grade and 
score measure the same kind of math knowledge (Ω). Even though there is a similarity 
between the NABC math test and the school-based math test, the assumption that score and 
grade measure the same knowledge is not very accurate, since math knowledge cannot be 
observed directly, and both measures are only a proxy. One might assume, therefore, that 
score measures pupils’ math knowledge also with noise. This is expressed in Eq. 3: 
 
         (Eq. 3) 
 
It will be further assumed that math knowledge captured by test scores (Ωs) is correlated 
only imperfectly with math knowledge reflected in school grades (Ωg). Therefore  in Eq. 4 
might contain ability captured in score that is not reflected in grade. Basically Ψ is a kind of 
ability which is not directly observable by teachers, but which is reflected in test scores. In 
practical terms it could be understood as the ability to write tests; or in other words, to feel 
no stress and to apply knowledge learnt to solve new problems. This ability might correlate 
with Φ, but the correlation should not be large, since Ψ is not observable by teachers. 
Controlling for score, however, will also control for Ψ.  
 
          (Eq. 4) 
 
On the other hand, the measurement error in test score ) might be correlated to grade. 
Test scores are observed only once, but teachers award grades over a longer time period and 
they might be sensitive to abilities that are not reflected in test scores. It is plausible to 
assume that there are abilities observed by teachers but not measured in test scores – such as 
how pupils prepare their homework, how active they are in class, etc. It is assumed therefore 
that the covariance between grade and  is not zero.  
 
         (Eq. 5) 
 
Unfortunately neither latent knowledge in score (Ωs) nor the measurement error itself 
) is directly observable. Therefore there is no prior assumption about whether Φ and νs are 
correlated, and whether Φ could be interpreted as teachers’ grading standard or this grading 
standard and some unobserved ability (rewarded by teachers). Furthermore if νs has a direct 
effect on score, even in the case of a nil correlation between Φ and later test scores, grade 
might show an effect in Eq. 1. This is especially harmful, because it might be consistent with 
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the interpretation of Φ. That said, in Eq. 1 one is not able to establish whether Φ has an effect, 
or whether the measurement error in score ) biases the results. 
This problem could be ruled out if all unobserved ability were controlled for. However, 
this is naturally not a realistic scenario. There are, however, some possible solutions that 
might address this issue; these will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
2.4.1. Instrumental variable approach 
 
Prior research has found that the age at which a child begins school has a significant effect on 
later school achievement (Fredriksson and Öckert 2005; Massey, Elliott, and Ross 1996; 
Strøm 1995). Month of birth has already been used as an instrument for ability in settings 
similar to this study (Terrier 2014). As Puhani and Weber (2007) argue, age at school entry 
could influence later academic achievement because of maturity: pupils simply have better 
concentration and are better able to organize themselves. Even though month of birth is a 
good instrument for ability, it is not an appropriate instrument for teachers’ grading 
standard.  
On the other hand, literature about the teacher’s pet phenomenon (Tal and Babad 1990) 
has shown that pets (based on students’ nomination) are usually charming and compliant 
pupils with social skills, but are not necessarily the best-performing pupils. Applying the 
Ideal Pupil and Personality checklist developed by (Torrance 1963) in a survey situation, 
many empirical analyses (Fryer and Collings 1991; Kaltsounis and Higdon 1977) have found 
that teachers regard characteristics such as being a disturbing influence on the group, talking 
in class, being negative, or being unwilling to accept things as the features to be discouraged 
most in pupil behavior. Based on this argumentation, it could be assumed that pupils’ school 
behavior might be a good proxy for teachers’ grading standard, especially in terms of 
receiving inflated grades for a given level of performance. It is argued that the part of the 
math grade which correlates with school behavior shows the part of the grade which contains 
the teacher’s rating, independently of latent ability. Using school behavior as an instrument, 
only that part of grade will be analyzed which correlates with it. Therefore all unobserved 
ability will be eliminated in this way. This is shown in Eq. 6 and Eq. 7.  
 
      (Eq. 6) 
   (Eq. 7) 
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2.4.2. Diff-in-diff approach 
 
An alternative way to handle this problem would be to eliminate unobserved ability both 
from grade and from score. This is possible, since there are two observations (year 6 and year 
8) for each. The difference in score and grade is created using the formulas below:  
 
      (Eq. 8) 
       (Eq. 9) 
 
 
Hence the diff-in-diff approach is calculated using Eq. 10: 
 
   (Eq. 10) 
 
Even though calculating differences is powerful, there are two limitations here: first, the 
relationship will not be causal (partly because the time difference between grade and score 
was lost), and secondly because one part of the effect of teachers’ grading standard will also 
be eliminated if it is considered time invariant. 
2.4.3. Year 10 outcomes 
 
In order to resolve one of the shortcomings of the diff-in-diff approach (that the relationship 
between score and grade is not causal) year 10 outcomes are analyzed. Using Eq. 11, four 
different dependent variables (Y) are analyzed: secondary school versus vocational education; 
secondary general versus secondary vocational school; math test scores; and educational 
plans. The difference in grade and score (between year 6 and year 8) appear on the right-
hand side, controlling (in both cases) for the level in year 6 ( ). Classroom fixed effects 
( ) are also employed. In the models for year 10 test scores and educational plans, some 
additional control variables are used: math grade in year 10 and the secondary track that the 
pupil is following in year 10 ( ), since in these specifications every pupil changed 
classroom and even school, and the secondary track might have an influence on these 
outcomes (Hermann 2013). In these two later models, fixed effects are defined as the 
combination of year 6 classroom and year 10 school ( ), since they are assumed to be shaped 
by the unobserved quality of secondary schools. Lastly, in the model fitted to year 10 
educational plans, the year 8 educational plans also appear among the year 10 control ( ). 
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  (Eq. 11) 
 
 
2.5. THE CEILING EFFECT, THE FLOOR EFFECT AND THE TEACHER’S MERCY 
MECHANISM 
 
Since pupils are not able to achieve a grade higher than 5, if somebody performs very well at 
time t-1 and subsequently increases his performance, he will still only receive a grade of 5 at 
time t; thus he is more likely to be classified as under-rated than if he had received any other 
grade at time t-1 (ceiling effect).  
The opposite of this effect would be the floor effect, since pupils cannot have a worse 
grade than 1. This might work even in the opposite direction and lead to over-rated grades. 
However, a third mechanism could even be in operation. A pupil who receives the worst 
grade must repeat the school year, and this can have unpleasant consequences for teachers 
(more work, ethical qualms). In order to avoid any inconvenience, many teachers award a 
school grade of 2 even for very poor performance. Therefore many pupils who are spared by 
the teacher and receive a 2 are classified as over-rated. This teacher’s mercy mechanism 
could also bias the estimated parameters since it means that the grade someone receives is in 
fact an already over-rated evaluation. Note that the ceiling and the teacher’s mercy 
mechanism (or floor effect) could cancel one another out, since they work in different 
directions.  
One possible way of finding out whether these mechanisms are in operation is to observe 
the pairwise difference between grades. Put differently: concentrating on only a one-unit 
change (comparing grade 1 with grade 2, grade 2 with grade 3, and so on), which also means 
gradually changing the baseline instead of fixing it at a particular grade level.  
3. RESULTS 
3.1. GRADES AND SCHOOL BEHAVIOR  
 
The instrumental variable approach requires a profound analysis of the validity of school 
behavior, especially to find out whether it might capture teachers’ biased grading standard. 
The argumentation for the instrument is that teachers might discriminate between pupils 
based on their school behavior. This assumption is plausible, in the sense that teachers may 
cooperate better with disciplined pupils (Fryer and Collings 1991; Kaltsounis and Higdon 
1977). The raw connection between year 6 grades and year 6 school behavior (plotted on 
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Figure 1) seems to support this assumption. Pupils who are better at math are also those who 
are more disciplined. Even after controlling for prior math grade and gender (as Column 1 of 
Table 1 shows), those with better marks for school behavior receive better grades (assuming 
that grades are linearly distributed). 
Figure 1.  
The relationship between grade and school behavior, year 6 
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It is further assumed that school behavior correlates with test scores only through the 
math grade. This is a necessary assumption if school behavior is understood to contain no 
more latent ability than the math grade. As Column 2 of Table 1 shows, only outstanding 
school behavior has a positive effect on year 8 test scores (b = 0.246, p < 0.001). After the 
year 6 math grade is also controlled for (Column 3), school behavior does not have a direct 
effect on the year 8 test score: only the math grade does. It should be noted, however, that 
school behavior has a marginally significant and negative effect (in low categories) if the 
lagged math score is introduced as a continuous variable. This is important to remember, 
since the instrumental variable approach can proceed only on the assumption that the math 
grade is linear. However, since the effect is marginally significant and negative (which is 
contrary to the hypothesis that school behavior captures some latent ability), it is unlikely to 
bias the results later, and hence school behavior might be an appropriate instrument.  
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Table 1. 
 First step of instrumental variable approach 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Year 6 
grade 
Year 8 
score 
Year 8 
score 
Year 8 
score 
Year 6 grade (ref. Grade = 1)     
Grade 2   0.100**  
   (0.013)  
Grade 3   0.300**  
   (0.013)  
Grade 4   0.532**  
   (0.014)  
Grade 5   0.799**  
   (0.014)  
Year 6 school behavior (ref. Grade = 1)     
Grade 2 0.274* -0.073 -0.101 -0.135+ 
 (0.103) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) 
Grade 3 0.556** -0.002 -0.076 -0.128+ 
 (0.102) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) 
Grade 4 0.913** 0.109 -0.038 -0.097 
 (0.102) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) 
Grade 5 1.365** 0.246** -0.007 -0.062 
 (0.102) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) 
Year 6 score (standardized) 0.648** 0.718** 0.568** 0.572** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female 0.008 -0.092** -0.095** -0.094** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Year 6 grade (continuous)    0.226** 
    (0.002) 
Constant 2.423** -0.109 -0.353** -0.656** 
 (0.102) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) 
Observations 141,975 141,975 141,975 141,975 
R-squared 0.482 0.581 0.618 0.617 
Number of classrooms 10,644 10,644 10,644 10,644 
Classroom FE YES YES YES YES 
p 0 0 0 0 
F 17924 17482 11990 16735 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.001, * p<0.01, + p<0.05 
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3.2. MAIN RESULTS  
 
The main results are summarized in Table 2. Column 1 shows the results of the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimator while grades are introduced in discrete categories. The results show 
a positive effect; moreover, the size of the estimated parameter increases nearly linearly as 
the grade increases. Therefore in Column 2, using the same OLS estimator, the effect of grade 
is estimated if it is introduced as a continuous variable in the model. The estimated 
parameter is almost a quarter of the standard deviation of math test scores (b = 0.235, p < 
0.001), showing that if someone receives a better grade for a given level of prior test score, he 
or she will experience progress in the test score which is approximately 25% of the standard 
deviation. This change is calculated as a one-unit change, which should be understood 
nominally – e.g. receiving grade 5 instead of grade 4. 
However, this figure, estimated with OLS, is assumed to be biased by unobserved ability 
– or more precisely, by ability that can be observed by the teacher, but that is not reflected in 
the test score. Assuming that teachers’ discriminatory grading standard is driven by pupils’ 
school behavior, an instrumental variable approach is used. The results are plotted in 
Column 3. The estimated effect for grade is somewhat higher than the OLS results (b = 0.301, 
p < 0.001). One possible explanation is that abilities that may be observed by teachers, but 
not by the test contribute negatively to the gain in test scores. Those pupils who participate 
actively in math lessons and do their homework regularly are not necessarily those who will 
progress more. It could even be the reverse: however important and valuable these abilities 
are, they may compensate for a lack of understanding of the math curriculum. 
Column 4 shows results of the diff-in-diff approach. The result is somewhat lower than 
the OLS estimation, but still positive (b = 0.188, p < 0.001). This strengthens the findings of 
prior models that being over-rated is associated with a positive test score. However, the result 
here is not causal: both grade and score are defined as the difference between year 6 and year 
8 measures, hence the sequence in the data is also eradicated. The estimated lower figure 
obtained with this model could be explained by the fact that the time-invariant component of 
teachers’ grading standards is eliminated from the difference. It is therefore plausible that as 
well as the change in teachers’ grading standards, the time-invariant component might also 
correlate positively with test scores. 
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Table 2. 
Main results, explaining year 8 test scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Year 8 score DIFF-score 
 OLS OLS IV DID 
     
Year 6 grade (continuous)  0.235** 0.301**  
  (0.002) (0.005)  
DIFF-grade    0.188** 
    (0.002) 
Year 6 grade (ref. Grade = 1)     
Grade 2 0.113**   0.216** 
 (0.013)   (0.013) 
Grade 3 0.324**   0.497** 
 (0.013)   (0.013) 
Grade 4 0.566**   0.784** 
 (0.013)   (0.014) 
Grade 5 0.840**   1.125** 
 (0.014)   (0.015) 
Year 6 score (standardized) 0.569** 0.572** 0.523** -0.478** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Female -0.077** -0.077** -0.094** -0.105** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Missing grade (DIFF-grade set to 0)    -0.050** 
    (0.005) 
Constant -0.420** -0.782** -1.005** -0.592** 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.019) (0.013) 
Observations 141,975 141,975 141,975 141,975 
R-squared overall model 0.598 0.598 0.593 0.226 
Number of classrooms 10,644 10,644 10,644 10,644 
Classroom FE YES YES YES YES 
SE clustered YES YES NO YES 
Lagged grade    YES 
rho 0.403 0.402 0.402 0.413 
p 0 0 0 0 
F 19965 39033 . 4033 
Wald chi2   197358  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.001, * p<0.01, + p<0.05 
 
The results carried out with this analysis indicate that being over-rated in year 6 might 
increase pupils’ later math test scores in year 8. The exact size might range between the 
upper and lower bound results provided by IV regression and the diff-in-diff approach. The 
results seem to be robust, even after focusing on pairwise differences between grades. As 
Figure 2 illustrates (full results are given in Table A1 in the Appendix) the unit-by-unit 
difference between the grades is similar, with the exception of the gap between grade 1 and 
grade 2. This means that those who received grade 2 instead of grade 1 benefited less from 
being over-rated than any other group that had a similar one-unit difference between (any 
other two) grades. This could be because pupils cannot have a worse grade than 1 or else 
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pupils are simply given a grade 2 as a sign of teacher’s mercy. Both mechanisms translate to 
over-rated school performance, and hence the virtual difference between these two grades is 
smaller than the difference between any other two grades. Therefore pupils who receive grade 
2 instead of grade 1 are less motivated to achieve more. On the other hand, the ceiling effect 
seems not to bias the estimations, because the effect of grades on those who receive grade 5 
instead of grade 4 is not significantly different from the effect of someone receiving grade 4 
instead of grade 3.  
Figure 2.  
The effect of lagged grade on subsequent test scores,  
pairwise differences between grades 
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3.3. SOME CONSEQUENCES IN YEAR 10 OF BEING OVER-RATED 
 
In order to surmount one of the shortcomings of the diff-in-diff approach – lower bound 
estimation – other dependent variables are chosen. Using the difference in grade and score 
between year 6 and year 8, the year 10 outcome variables are explained. Even though these 
variables are partly categorical, an OLS estimator is employed, since – as previous literature 
has pointed out – calculating the marginal effects after logit models requires greater care 
(Buis 2010; Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004).  
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Table 3.  
Explaining year 10 outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Secondary / 
vocational 
year 10 
Sec. gen./ Sec. 
voc. 
year 10 
Math score, 
year 10 
Year 10 plan 
DIFF-grade 0.080** 0.114** 0.075** 0.032** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
DIFF-score 0.029** 0.041** 0.384** 0.020** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Year 10 math grade     
1 (worst)   Ref. Ref. 
2   0.046** 0.069** 
   (0.013) (0.009) 
3   0.132** 0.147** 
   (0.013) (0.009) 
4   0.223** 0.197** 
   (0.013) (0.010) 
5 (best)   0.321** 0.209** 
   (0.015) (0.010) 
Type of school (year 10)     
Secondary general   0.088** 0.149** 
   (0.008) (0.006) 
Secondary vocational   Ref. Ref. 
Vocational   -0.280** -0.139** 
   (0.012) (0.007) 
Year 8 plan    0.368** 
    (0.006) 
Plan is missing    0.212** 
    (0.008) 
Female 0.044** 0.132** -0.216** 0.018** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Constant 0.277** 0.070+ -0.362** 0.075** 
 (0.015) (0.028) (0.036) (0.018) 
Observations 72,966 62,928 69,547 69,937 
R-squared overall model 0.225 0.256 0.534 0.449 
Year 6 grade YES YES YES YES 
Year 6 score YES YES YES YES 
Number of classrooms 7,178 7,109   
Year 6 classroom FE YES YES   
N of year 6 classroom & sec.-school FE    28,312 28,414 
Year 6 classroom & sec.-school FE   YES YES 
SE clustered YES YES YES YES 
rho 0.225 0.256 0.534 0.449 
p 0 0 0 0 
F 1247 1300 4928 1595 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.001, * p<0.01, + p<0.05 
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The results are shown in Table 3. Being over-rated increases the likelihood that a pupil 
will choose more demanding education, irrespective of whether the horizontal (Column 1) or 
the vertical (Column 2) differences are considered between the secondary tracks. A one-unit 
increase in grade translates into an approximately 8% increase in the likelihood of a pupil 
embarking on the secondary school (rather than the vocational) track, and also increases the 
likelihood of a pupil following secondary general school track (instead of secondary 
vocational) by approximately 11%.  
Receiving inflated grades also boosts the year 10 math performance. A one-unit better 
grade increases the math test score by 7.5% (Column 3), and increases the chances of a year 
10 pupil considering tertiary education by approximately 3%. Note that these results are 
calculated after controlling for prior educational plans in year 8, the secondary education 
track that a pupil is following, and after applying year 10 school fixed effects (Column 4).  
The results suggest that the grading standard used in elementary school might 
accompany pupils into secondary school, where their teachers and classmates are completely 
new, and where the elementary school grading standard should not have a direct effect. One 
possible mechanism by which the grading standard could influence later outcomes in year 10 
is through self-assessment. As was argued in previous research, self-assessment might have 
an effect in educational transition – simply stimulating a pupil to dare to choose more 
demanding education (Keller 2014).  
4. DISCUSSION 
The empirical evidence of this paper supports the idea that receiving inflated school grades 
for a given level of performance in year 6 may have a positive effect on subsequent test scores 
in year 8. Even though, its exact size might not be measured without bias throughout the 
research, different approaches yield an equally positive impact, whether IV regression is used 
or the diff-in-diff model is employed. Furthermore, choosing year 10 outcomes and 
employing the difference in grades between year 6 and year 8 also reveals that grade 
maintains a positive influence on secondary track choice, secondary school performance, and 
further educational plans. 
It is argued that teachers’ assessment might increase self-assessed ability, which 
influences the effort that pupils invest in their own education (Azmat and Iriberri 2010). 
Since school performance is a combination of ability and effort, and since any investment in 
effort is costly, those pupils who have a more positive knowledge of their ability might be 
prepared to invest greater effort, since they are more certain that the investment is 
worthwhile. This reasoning is in line with previous findings, which show that if someone’s 
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knowledge is confirmed by the teacher, this approval will boost the pupil’s  self-confidence, 
which could be translated into educational outcomes (Pajares and Schunk 2001).  
Supporting this argumentation, the results show that being over-rated and getting a one-
unit better grade in year 6 of elementary school increased math performance two years later, 
in year 8 (but still at the same school), by between 0.188 and 0.301 standard deviation, and 
year 10 math performance (in a different school and classroom environment) by 0.075 
standard deviation. Since the standard deviation of math grade in year 6 is approximately one 
unit, and the standard deviation of DIFF-grade is approximately 0.7 of a unit, the results 
could be compared to the findings of Rivkin et al. (2005). They showed that a one standard 
deviation increase in teacher quality translates into an increase in math performance in the 
next year of 0.095 standard deviation. Hence, even considering that the results in this recent 
analysis are calculated for two years (not for one), the estimated effect of teacher’s grading 
standard is somewhat larger than teacher quality. This might be on account of different 
methodology, but it could also be a consequence of other quality attributes of teachers which 
might decrease the impact of their grading standard.  
Contrary to previous research, which argues that a teacher’s assessment might act as a 
self-fulfilling prophecy (Rosenthal and Jacobson 1968) this paper argues that a teacher’s 
grading standard might work through supportive feedback and encouragement of pupils, 
especially in relation to their academic achievement (Schunk 1983). 
The findings presented here are new, in the sense that, unlike previous research (Betts 
and Grogger 2003; Terrier 2014), this analysis has been able to indicate the consequences of 
receiving inflated grades at the individual level (rather than the classroom or school level), 
while unobserved classroom-level heterogeneity is controlled for. Adding to prior 
scholarship, it is also established that being over-rated in elementary school may have 
consequences in secondary education as well. This is important, since elementary education 
and secondary education are institutionally separated in Hungary. For the sample analyzed 
in this paper it is shown that, even though pupils have different teachers and peers in 
secondary school, still a biased grading standard from their elementary education 
accompanies them to secondary school.  
4.1. LIMITATIONS  
 
There are some clear limitations to this analysis, and these invite a careful reading. First of 
all, because one of the aims was to minimize the possible bias caused by the measurement 
error in lagged test scores (unmeasured ability), different approaches were employed which 
assigned lower and upper bound estimations. But a more precise localization was not 
possible employing this scheme.  
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A further limitation is that grades and test scores might not measure the same concept. 
However, by restricting analysis to math test scores we basically seek to eliminate this bias; 
nevertheless, it could still be that latent ability biases the estimations. 
Finally, throughout the analysis it was assumed that those pupils who do not change 
classroom over time were taught by the same teacher between year 6 and year 8. However, 
since there was no information about teachers in the survey, the analysis was not able to go 
beyond this assumption. On the other hand, it is likely that teachers’ observable 
characteristics (especially their age and working experience) do have an influence on the 
grading standard that they employ.  
4.2. CONCLUSION 
 
One possible conclusion to be drawn from the results is that the grading standard used by 
teachers has a lasting – and in that sense sticky – effect for at least two reasons. First, it 
might influence pupils’ self-assessment, which may determine the effort that pupils invest in 
education. Though this was not tested directly, the results showed that those who were over-
rated in elementary school had more ambitious educational plans and followed more 
demanding secondary tracks. These findings could also indicate that a teacher’s assessment 
in terms of grades might be influenced by a pupil’s self-assessment, and especially by how 
ambitious that pupil is for further education.  
Secondly, the grading standard used by teachers in elementary school also influences 
pupil outcomes in secondary school. Every pupil in the sample changed school and moved 
from elementary into secondary education. This means that the rating they received at 
elementary school accompanied them into the new school and classroom environment of 
secondary education. 
Future analysis should cast further light on why teachers over-rate some pupils in the 
classroom. Previous analysis has shown that girls are more likely than boys to be teacher’s 
pets, and that teacher’s pets tend to have fairly good, but not excellent performance (Tal and 
Babad 1990). However, much more knowledge is needed about teachers’ characteristics in 
order to understand their grading standards. 
At this stage less is known about the possible negative effect of grades – especially 
whether pupils are spoilt if they receive inflated grades. Therefore the interpretation that the 
better the grades a pupil receives, the greater the benefits in terms of subsequent school 
performance is not necessarily supported by the results. Hopefully the results shown in this 
paper will contribute to greater understanding of how teachers employ grades, of what the 
long-run consequences are of receiving inflated grades, and especially of the heterogeneity in 
the effect of grades according to social background.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1.  
The effect of lagged grade on subsequent test scores,  
pairwise differences between grades 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Grade 1 
/Grade2 
Grade 2 
/Grade3 
Grade 4 
/Grade5 
Grade 4 
/Grade5 
     
Year 6 grade (continuous) 0.146** 0.231** 0.243** 0.253** 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Year 6 score (standardized) 0.476** 0.529** 0.567** 0.598** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female -0.085** -0.079** -0.076** -0.073** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant -0.697** -0.812** -0.819** -0.863** 
 (0.028) (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) 
Observations 27,289 66,053 86,377 73,267 
R-squared overall model 0.287 0.386 0.455 0.516 
Number of classrooms 10,644 10,644 10,644 10,644 
Classroom FE YES YES YES YES 
SE clustered YES YES YES YES 
rho 0.551 0.479 0.446 0.437 
p 0 0 0 0 
F 1620 8204 15071 17132 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.001, * p<0.01, + p<0.05 
 
 
